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RICE AND BEANS WITH A SIDE OF QUEER: SOCIO-LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN LGBTQ+ COMMUNITY

CARLOS A. FIGUEROA*

ABSTRACT
Over the last century, the LGBTQ+ community has occupied a
peculiar space in Cuba that has both resisted and acclimated to the
ever-changing sociopolitical dynamics on the Island. This Article
examines the Cuban queer community’s socio-legal history in preand post-Revolution Cuba along with its tumultuous synthesis into
U.S. culture.
INTRODUCTION
TERMINOLOGY
I. QUEER LIFE & THE LAW IN CUBA
A. Pre-Revolution Cuba
B. Post-Revolution Developments
II. UNITED STATES-CUBAN RELATIONS GET A LITTLE QUEER
A. An Exodus and Shifting Attitudes Towards Queer Cubans
B. Immigrant Queer Cubans as a Recognized Social Group
III. MODERN LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Reflections on Recent Cuban Movements
B. Comparative Study of Queer Rights in Latin America
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
When the Cuban community is mentioned in conversation, many
people are reminded of fictional Cuban refugee Tony Montana wreaking havoc in 1980s Miami,1 Russia’s deployment of nuclear weapons
on Cuban soil during conflicts with the United States in 1962,2 or
the Fidel Castro–led “Cuban Revolution” that cemented communist
* JD 2021, Tulane University Law School; AB 2016, Brown University. Thank you
to Professor José R. Cot for helping me develop this topic. I am equally grateful to my
immigrant Cuban family for their hard work and immense support.
1. See Gregory Jaynes, Miami Official Objects to Cuban Refugee Film, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1982, at A12.
2. See, e.g., Arnold L. Horelick, The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet
Calculations and Behavior, 16 WORLD POL. 363, 363, 370–89 (1964).
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politics for the nation since 1959.3 However, none of these historic
markers directly emphasizes the social and legal experiences of the
Cuban LGBTQ+ community reported on as early as the 1800s by literary figures like José Martí.4 While other nations are finally shedding light on the marginalization of queer experiences with their
increased visibility in mainstream culture,5 this form of recognition
lags in places like Cuba. Given the incredible amount of violence
toward the LGBTQ+ community in most Latin American countries,
it’s no surprise queer Latinx people feel unsafe sharing their experiences or fighting for better legal rights6 despite postmillennial
glimmers of socio-legal progress largely left unfinished in Cuba.7
This Article acknowledges that the queer community’s historic
place as an obscure or disregarded part of Cuban culture requires
further attention. Throughout, and where appropriate, comparisons
between queer rights in other Latin American nations are described.
Part I scrutinizes various pre- and post-revolution constitutional
documents, laws and other legal practices affecting queer people in
Cuba, along with a review of certain personal experiences under these
regimes. Part II considers United States-Cuban relations with respect to progressing queer rights in Cuba that develops at odds with
both Cuban assimilation in the United States and legal implications
affecting queer Cuban immigrants following the Mariel Boatlift.
Part III provides a reflection on modern constitutional and social
developments affecting the Cuban queer community to this day. The
persistence of queer Cubans—despite a tumultuous relationship with
law and society—indicates there is hope for their gradual acceptance
even if shrouded in a nation’s problematic system.
3. See, e.g., Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and the Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA L. REV.
107, 119–20 (2000).
4. See Kristie Soares, Traveling Queer Subjects: Homosexuality in the Cuban Diaspora,
45 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS HISPANICOS 635, 635–36 (2011) (detailing the relationship
between “[h]omosexual bodies” and “male effeminacy” in Jose Marti’s nineteenth century
writings concerning Cuba).
5. See, e.g., Erica Ruff, Note, Straight Actors in LGBT Roles: Creative Casting or
Employment Discrimination?, 25 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 550, 567–68
(2019) (commenting on increasing “small victories” for LGBT stories in the U.S. entertainment industry).
6. See Marilia Brocchetto, The Perplexing Narrative About Being Gay in Latin
America, CNN (Mar. 3, 2017, 7:04 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/26/americas/lgbt
-rights-in-the-americas/index.html [https://perma.cc/2AKV-XPSY].
7. See Jasmine Garsd, On Being Gay, And Socialist, In Cuba Today, NPR (June 26,
2014, 3:46 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/06/26/325801573/on-being-gay
-and-socialist-in-cuba-today [https://perma.cc/EGM4-K2R8] (noting progressing attitudes
towards the LGBTQ+ population in Cuba despite the country’s lack of “concrete laws”
protecting the queer community).
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TERMINOLOGY
Members of the Cuban LGBTQ+ community are referred to as
“queer” interchangeably throughout this Article.8 Labeling any particular movements described in this Article as solely gay or lesbian
in nature, for example, would be diminishing the importance of the
transgender community’s contribution to these experiences, and perpetuate the societal erasure of many transgender people in Cuba and
other Latinx cultures.9 This is not to promote the idea that different
parts of the queer community are all the same, as each “othered”
experience can feel or look different depending on whether one identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, asexual or any
other non-heteronormative sexual or gender identity.10
I. QUEER LIFE & THE LAW IN CUBA
A. Pre-Revolution Cuba
During the early to mid-twentieth century, the LGBTQ+ community in Cuba gathered itself in the most populated area on the
island—Havana.11 This kind of queer “metronormative” exodus was
considered common to many cultures internationally,12 as it could
allow for “a more liberated life-style” that contrasted with the “interior
of the [Cuban] island.”13 Although a significant portion of the Cuban
queer community did thrive in rural parts of the island,14 these
8. See General Definitions, UNIV. CAL. S.F. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER
RES. CTR., http://lgbt.ucsf.edu/glossary-terms [https://perma.cc/5SDX-JJXR] (last visited
Dec. 6, 2021).
9. See TRANSLATIN@ COALITION, TRANSVISIBLE: TRANSGENDER LATINA IMMIGRANTS
IN U.S. SOCIETY 9–10 (2013) (identifying various Latinx cultures that “marginaliz[e]” and
“persecut[e]” the transgender community).
10. See Brenda Cossman, Queering Queer Legal Studies: An Unreconstructed Ode to Eve
Sedgwick (and Others), 6 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 23, 27 (2019) (arguing against the use of
“queer” as “synonymous with LGBT identity” due to varied, often clashing experiences).
11. Lourdes Arguelles & B. Ruby Rich, Homosexuality, Homophobia, and Revolution:
Notes Toward an Understanding of the Cuban Lesbian and Gay Male Experience, Part I,
9 SIGNS 684, 685 (1984).
12. See Bud W. Jerke, Queer Ruralism, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 259, 270–72 (2011)
(recognizing contentious scholarship that focuses on queer people feeling forced to leave
rural areas to avoid being “oppressed, persecuted, unaccepted, and isolated”).
13. Arguelles & Rich, supra note 11, at 685.
14. Legal and social scholarship identifying the movement of queer Cubans to Havana
is likely accurate to an extent, but this does not account for the considerable population
of satisfied queer people living in rural areas that have likely been unstudied by virtue
of not living somewhere more accessible and “metropolitan.” See Jerke, supra note 12,
at 271–73 (explaining that the “assumption” of queer communities historically moving
to urban areas is harmful given the growing scholarship identifying dynamic queer life
that existed and continues to exist in rural areas).

424

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 28:421

smaller areas—characterized mostly by “prerevolutionary villages”—
made rural living more “intimate” and convenient to police queerness.15 This made it easier to simply identify the one or two seemingly
LGBTQ+ community members and led to their ostracization from
the Cuban village.16
The machismo-dominated culture that promoted the idea that
heterosexuality was “compulsory” was particularly felt in these rural
areas, although the same idea nevertheless emerged in city centers,
like Havana, increasingly populated and visited by capitalist Americans that brought their own patriarchal influences by the 1940s.17
Still, there were certain accounts of mainstream LGBTQ+ acceptance documented by Cuban writers, such as Ana María Simó and
Reinaldo García Ramos, who remembered “openly or discreetly
homosexual lifestyles” in pre-revolutionary Cuba and described “an
evident homosexual sensibility” in local 1950s and 1960s music.18 But
these moments of acceptance have largely been eclipsed by more turbulent legal and historical accounts.19
For example, the pre-revolutionary government enacted the
Public Ostentation Law in 1938 as part of Cuba’s Penal Code, which
did not explicitly outlaw the existence of homosexuals in its language,
but made it illegal to display “public homosexual behavior” anywhere
in the country, implicitly putting many in the queer community at
risk for persecution merely for their existence.20 Cuba’s 1940 Constitution, the final one before the revolutionary government’s takeover,21
similarly harmed and marginalized its queer community by failing
to consider the inclusion of any positive rights—whether through
affirmations of their equality or rights to same-sex marriage.22
Arguelles & Rich, supra note 11, at 686.
See id.
See id. at 685–87.
Rafael Ocasio, Gays and the Cuban Revolution: The Case of Reinaldo Arenas, 29
LATIN AM. PERSPS. 78, 91–92 (2002) (quoting Ana María Simó & Reinaldo García Ramos,
Hablemos claro, MARIEL, Spring 1984, at 9–10) (internal quotations omitted).
19. See id. at 78; see also CODIGO DEF. SOC. VIGENTE REPÚBLICA CUBA, CUBA CODIGO
PENAL, art. 384–85 (1938) [hereinafter CUBA CODIGO PENAL].
20. CUBA CODIGO PENAL, art. 384–85 (1979) [Current Social Defense Code of the
Cuban Republic, art. 384–85] (listing “pública ostentación de su condición de
homosexual” as illegal); see also Kimberly Gonzalez, Civil Marriage and Gay Union Law
in the Americas, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 285, 294 (2010) (summarizing the landscape for
queer rights in Cuba).
21. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of
Cuban Nationals’ Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 16 UNIV. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 217,
227–28 (1995).
22. See CONST. CUBA (available from HeinOnline World Constitutions Illustrated,
edited by Jefri Jay Ruchti and translated by Anna I. Vellvé Torras) (for instance, marriage
refers to a man and a woman in Article 43).
15.
16.
17.
18.
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Members of queer subcommunities—like homosexuals—are mentioned explicitly in the country’s Penal Code yet never referenced in
its 1940 Constitution.23
The only remotely beneficial law to the LGBTQ+ community
during this time period was the impression that the community’s
criminal liability could technically never lead to death, as the 1940
Constitution only allowed the death penalty for “crimes of a military
character . . . [and] treason or of espionage.”24 Beyond the implied
freedom to simply avoid death,25 the Constitution ignored queer
people. Article Forty-Three of the 1940 Constitution, defines marriage
as the “legal foundation of the family” that depends on the “absolute
equality of rights for both spouses.”26 Moreover, the marriage “can
[only] be dissolved by agreement of the spouses.”27 The only other
reference to marriage in the 1940 Constitution occurs in Article Sixteen, which indicates “spouses or their children” do not have their
nationality threatened after a divorce.28 Because neither of these
articles discuss the existence of a marriage or family without necessitating both a husband and wife, many queer Cubans were prevented from seeking same-sex marriage during this time period.29
Although this was not a discriminatory scheme unique to Cuba
or the worst to exist internationally even by today’s standards,30
erasure of the queer existence in law outside of criminal liability
illustrates the caution queer Cubans had to take just to exist.31 And
caution is exactly what they took while attempting to integrate into
Havana’s culture just before the Revolution further complicated their
relatively underground lifestyle.32 Queer Cubans in 1950s Havana
remained difficult below the surface, too, given the intensifying levels
of unemployment affecting the country.33
23. Compare id., with CUBA CODIGO PENAL, art. 384–85.
24. CONST. CUBA, art. 25.
25. See id.
26. CONST. CUBA, art. 43.
27. Id.
28. CONST. CUBA, art. 16.
29. See CONST. CUBA, art. 16, 43.
30. Netherlands, the first nation to recognize same-sex marriage, did not do so until
2001. See Johanna Kalb, Human Rights Proxy Wars, 13 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & C.L. 53, 65
(2017). Seventy countries still criminalize “same-sex conduct” in 2021, and seven nations
maintain the death penalty for such conduct. See #OUTLAWED: “The Love That Dare
Not Speak Its Name,” HUM. RTS. WATCH, http://internap.hrw.org/features/features/lgbt
_laws [https://perma.cc/M43G-XBZE] (last visited Dec. 6, 2021).
31. See CUBA CODIGO PENAL, art. 384–85.
32. See Arguelles & Rich, supra note 11, at 686 (“everyday life was not easy for the
working-class . . . homosexual”).
33. See id. (explaining the difficult employment situation for the queer community).
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This demanded queer people in the workplace to remain “closeted”
simply to maintain their livelihood.34 Their protection from employment discrimination was arguably non-existent, as the Ministry of
Labor, pursuant to the Constitution, only prohibited “discriminatory
practices” in the scope of “sex, race, color, class, and any other [kind
of discrimination] damaging human dignity.”35 The 1940 Constitution’s reference to “sex” and “any other kind of discrimination” could
seemingly encapsulate concepts like sexual orientation and gender
identity, but the nearly one hundred signatories in mid-twentieth
century Cuba likely did not consider that given the explicit criminalization for homosexual behavior.36 Let alone the fact that a textualist interpretation of the word “sex” to include sexual orientation and
gender identity in the mid-twentieth by leaders opposing the LGBTQ+
community would be highly unlikely, even if it eventually happened
many years later.37 Thus, fabricating heterosexual romances to deceive
suspicious co-workers in the workplace was common and necessary
for many in the queer community to avoid poverty or incarceration
in pre-revolutionary Cuba.38
Although Fulgencio Batista’s successful “military coup d’état”
to seize the Cuban government in 1952 meant that the previously
adopted Constitution lost much of its enforcement,39 the new and
short-lived regime did not protect the queer community. Batista’s
initial leadership garnered positive reception from U.S. leaders,40
which bled into the way queer people interacted with Americans on
Cuban soil. A gradual shift had occurred, where “American organized
crime” found its way to Havana involving the sex, drug, gambling,
and tourism industries through “Batista’s political apparatus.”41 Even
frequented queer-friendly bars came to be “owned” through “organized
34. Id.
35. CONST. CUBA, art. 20, 74.
36. CONST. CUBA, art. 20; see CUBA CODIGO PENAL, art. 384–85 (1938).
37. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A Tale of Two Formalisms: How Law and
Economics Mirrors Originalism and Textualism, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 591, 594–95 n.12,
637–38 (2021) (explaining that U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Neil M. Gorsuch’s
apparent textualist interpretation of the word “sex” in Bostock v. Clayton County does
not signify a pattern of “Justices subordinating their ideological priors to their methodological priors”); Neil Gorsuch Has an Unacceptable, Hostile Record Towards LGBT
People, LAMBDA LEGAL (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20170131_no-to
-neil-gorsuch [https://perma.cc/LSZ7-GGMN] (describing Justice Gorsuch’s patterned
“anti-LGBT rulings”).
38. See Arguelles & Rich, supra note 11, at 686.
39. Ignacio E. Sánchez, Cuban Property Rights and the 1940 Constitution, 3 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 135, 135 (1994) (describing the brief shift to a Batista-led government
in 1950s Cuba).
40. Thomas Carothers, Backing the Wrong Tyrant, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1994, at BR34.
41. Arguelles & Rich, supra note 11, at 686–87.
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crime.”42 The existence of the LGBTQ+ community was shrouded in
secrecy; queer life could only thrive with the presence of American
tourists demanding “homoerotic experiences” from local Cuban
queer employees in isolated instances.43 Queer Cubans during the
pre-revolution era could never truly be themselves, as the government harmed or erased their identities through laws while the same
government benefitted by exploiting queer bodies as “a profitable
commodification of sexual fantasy.”44
B. Post-Revolution Developments
After Fidel Castro’s rise to power in the 1959 Communist Revolution, constitutional protections defining Cuba’s twentieth century—including private property rights—vanished.45 Historically,
marginalized communities—often located in more rural areas of the
island—did not share in much of Cuba’s success.46 In addition to
organized crime, independent farming, land ownership, and the
sugar industries all exploited the less privileged people of color and
queer communities.47 The Revolution had inspired many people in
these Cuban communities to expect “racial unity” as soon as Castro’s
leadership ousted the capitalist influence and their constitutional
regime.48 Yet these expectations went largely unfulfilled, as “equity”
for these marginalized communities in Cuba would only progress
minimally once “protection of political minorities” in a “climate of
[counter-revolutionary] fear” resulted in a ban on freedom of expression for many minorities, including queer people.49
Castro’s Cuba brought with it the notion that the government
should be policing queer people exploring their sexual and gender
identities just as much, if not more so, than under the nation’s
42. Id. at 687.
43. Id. at 686–87.
44. Id. at 687–88.
45. See, e.g., Jon Mills & Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Whither Communism: A Comparative
Perspective on Constitutionalism in a Postsocialist Cuba, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
1219, 1224 (2009).
46. See TEISHAN A. LATNER, CUBAN REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: HAVANA AND THE MAKING
OF A UNITED STATES LEFT, 1968–1992 2–3 (Univ. N.C. Press 2018) (explaining that various
people hoped racial equality would follow the Revolution); Mills & Koslosky, supra note
45, at 1226–27 (describing the lineage of property owners in pre-revolutionary Cuba).
47. See Mills & Koslosky, supra note 45, at 1223–24; Arguelles & Rich, supra note
11, at 686–88.
48. See LATNER, supra note 46, at 3.
49. Id. at 5–6. This is not to say progress for racial minorities was non-existent in Cuba,
but a significant portion of post-revolutionary focus on assisting minorities seemed to result
in merely protecting foreign minorities—both racial and political—holding socialist views
to strategically advance Cuba’s place as a foreign power and develop “allies.” Id. at 5.
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previous constitutional regime; a product of the new government’s
promulgation of dynamic independence and martial strength of “machismo” culture defined in its idea of communism.50 Queer Cubans
continued in their place of being legally and culturally unwanted.51
To post-revolution Cuba, the very same capitalist regime that exploited the queer community’s labor, sexualized their bodies in the
1940s and 1950s during the bourgeoisie’s prime,52 and simultaneously
imprisoned them for “behaving” homosexually53 was also to blame
for the existence of queer people in the first place.54 The new Cuban
government reasoned the malignant queer community itself was “a
product of bourgeois decadence” that was not organically grown from
within Cuba’s true population.55 In Fidel Castro’s own words, he
explained his government’s antagonism towards the queer community as a means of protecting their communist society:
[W]e would never come to believe that a homosexual could embody the conditions and requirements of conduct that would enable
us to consider him a true Revolutionary, a true Communist militant. A deviation of that nature clashes with the concept we have
of what a militant communist should be. . . . But I will be frank
and say that homosexuals should not be allowed in positions
where they are able to exert influence upon young people . . . [who
be must indoctrinated] with the spirit of discipline, of struggle,
of work.56

Just as the new post-revolution government’s perspective largely
demonized the queer population, their new sets of morality laws and
regulations did so as well—to a startlingly worse degree.57 Law enforcement legally apprehended international public figures, such as
poet Virgilio Piñera, throughout the 1960s and 1970s for alleged
morality crimes and those public figures even saw their previously
acceptable artistic works “refused publication” or entirely discarded by
law enforcement because their “overt homosexuality” was egregious
50. See SUSANA PEÑA, ¡OYE LOCA!: FROM THE MARIEL BOATLIFT TO GAY CUBAN MIAMI
3–4 (Univ. Minn. Press 2013) [hereinafter ¡OYE LOCA!].
51. See id. (detailing the various cultural and legal structures that stifled queer
Cubans).
52. See Arguelles & Rich, supra note 11, at 687.
53. See CUBA CODIGO PENAL, art. 384–85.
54. See ¡OYE LOCA!, supra note 50, at 2–3.
55. See id. at 3 (internal quotations omitted).
56. MARVIN LEINER, SEXUAL POLITICS IN CUBA: MACHISMO, HOMOSEXUALITY, AND AIDS
26 (Routledge 2019) (citing LEE LOCKWOOD, CASTRO’S CUBA, CUBA’S FIDEL (New York:
Vintage Books 1967) (emphasis added).
57. See CUBA CODIGO PENAL, art. 384–85 (1938); Arguelles & Rich, supra note 11, at
687–94.
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to Cuban Communism.58 Vital figures in the government, including
attorneys, government leaders, and judges had become tools to “silence dissident[]” behavior that became synonymous with policing
social behavior beyond just common crimes or instances of overzealous political expression.59
With the adoption of the National Assembly of People’s Power’s
adoption of 1970 Penal Code, queer behavior could be criminalized
both for public displays of homosexuality—like the penal code of the
late 1930s—along with mere private acts of intimacy between people
of the same sex that the public could potentially view.60 This demonstrated Cuba’s ability and willingness to invade the queer community’s
private spaces, as merely being caught in the act by police could be
interpreted as “public.”61 Furthermore, the strict liability nature of
criminal prosecution as a queer Cuban seemed entirely at odds with
post-revolution Cuba’s alleged willingness to approach potential criminal behavior through motivational indicators much like the mens
rea element required of many crimes in the United States.62
For example, in the government’s adoption of the 1979 Cuban
Penal Code, legislators included indicators to describe various felonies,
like “delito intencional” (intentional crimes), “delito por imprudencia”
(negligence crimes), and “actos preparatorios” (preparatory crimes)
as a way to differentiate culpability and the severity of any penalties.63 After Castro admitted his uncertainty concerning the cause
of queer behavior and the importance of examining it, the idea that
there would be new respect for queer Cubans seemed possible.64 Yet
forcing the queer community into a box of finite motivational indicators65 within the Cuban Penal Code destroyed any possibility that a
sense of empathy would occur in Cuba. How could the Cuban government take the time to understand a seemingly misunderstood
community’s intentions that merely wanted to be accepted, if manifesting a certain feminine, butch, or non-binary behavior or disposition externally could be policed under the Cuban Penal Code?66
58. MARK WEISS, THE WHOLE ISLAND: SIX DECADES OF CUBAN POETRY 566 (Univ. Cal.
Press 2009); see also Arguelles & Rich, supra note 11, at 691–94.
59. See Erik Luna, Cuban Criminal Justice and the Idea of Good Governance, 14
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 529, 531–32 (2004).
60. See CUBA CODIGO PENAL, art. 359 (1979).
61. See id.
62. Max Azicri, Crime and Law Under Socialism: The 1979 Cuban Penal Code, 6 REV.
SOCIALIST L. 5, 16–18 (1980) (discussing felonious behavior and sanctions under the
nation’s updated penal code).
63. Id. at 17.
64. See LEINER, supra note 56.
65. See Azicri, supra note 62, at 17.
66. See id.
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Certain accounts of Cuban life have implied that law enforcement
considered “long hair, tight pants, colorful shirts, effeminate mannerisms” to be “visible markers of male homosexuality” in the context of arrest.67
If this is true, that meant the Cuban government could arbitrarily
rationalize the decision to put on a pair of fitted pants as sufficient
“intent” to commit the crime of public homosexuality under the Cuban
Penal Code.68 Equally troubling, law enforcement could arrest a male
Cuban citizen for negligent homosexual behavior if the queer person
should have “anticipated the consequences” of styling their hair in
a less masculine-seeming way—irrespective of their actual sexuality
and merely on the presentation of perceived gender norms.69 The
country’s “Ley de Peligrosidad” became embedded in the government’s
culture and “pre-criminality” defined the treatment of queer people.70
The post-revolution government promulgated further discriminatory provisions against the queer community in the Constitution of
1976—the most recent update since 1940 and the first to incorporate
the “socialist ownership of property” along with government-based
“powers” to oversee the nation’s communist economy.71 Unsurprisingly, even the communist-driven 1976 Constitution shared one thing
in common with the diametrically opposed 1940 Constitution: omitting positive rights of any kind to queer people or making mention
of them at all.72 Article Thirty-Five of the 1976 Constitution’s discussion of marriage yet again explicitly outlined that there could only be
a “union [between] a man and a woman” to share “absolute equality
of rights.”73 Importantly, Article Forty-One’s explanation of forbidden discrimination on the basis of “race, color, sex, religious creeds,
national origin, or any other type offending human dignity” largely
remained unchanged as well, except for qualifications to what can
offend “human dignity.”74 Rather than leave “human dignity” as a
non-exhaustive list for other identities like those in the queer community, Article Forty-Two specified nine instances that constituted
discrimination to human dignity.75
Because Article Forty-Two specifies that illegal discrimination
occurs when a person is not given a job despite being qualified, not
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

¡OYE LOCA!, supra note 50, at 6.
See Azicri, supra note 62, at 17.
See ¡OYE LOCA!, supra note 50, at 6; Azicri, supra note 62, at 17.
See ¡OYE LOCA!, supra note 50, at 5.
Mills & Koslosky, supra note 45, at 1224–27; see also CONST. CUBA (1976).
Compare CONST. CUBA (1976), with CONST. CUBA (1940).
CONST. CUBA, art. 35 (1976).
CONST. CUBA, art. 41 (1976).
CONST. CUBA, art. 42 (1976).
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able to choose where they want to live freely, or not able to use all
“social centers[;]” thus, queer people are impliedly unincluded from
Article Forty-Two’s “human dignity” catch-all for social equality.76
When Fidel Castro expressly called for the exclusion of queer people
from any positions of influence over Cuba’s youth population,77 he
suggested that queer people were an exception to the “human dignity” definition.78 How could someone perceived as homosexual by
the Cuban government be allowed to use any “social center” of their
choosing without discrimination, if places like parks, beaches, and
gyms prescribed children the right to use those same facilities?79
How could a queer person exercise their rights under the Constitution to “access” an employment position at an elementary school
despite meeting all “merits and capacities” professionally required
of the position?80
Being punished for existing as queer alone distressed these communities, but the kind of punishment they endured was an entirely
different level of pain in post-revolution Cuba.81 The idea that queerness was a capitalist-inspired social illness meant that the Cuban
government thought they could “treat it”—a prescription of physical
labor was even ordered to “treat” queerness in the late 1960s.82 Castro
penalized Cuba’s queer people—along with other socially undesirable community members like Jehovah’s Witnesses—by placing them
in “Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción (UMAP)[,]” a set
of internment camps where the government forced “undesirable”
community members into agricultural labor.83 Cuban townspeople
even expressed gratitude and approval of the idea—signaling the
undeniably negative perception of queer bodies:
It’s good for them to work [in the camps] . . . A man is biologically
born a man, so why can he not function as a man? What is to keep
him from it but vice? Artists, especially dancers, almost have to be
homosexuals, I understand that, but why cannot they keep it to
76. See id.
77. LEINER, supra note 56, at 26.
78. See CONST. CUBA, art. 42 (1976).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See CUBA CODIGO PENAL, art. 384–85 (1938); Arguelles & Rich, supra note 11, at
691–92; ¡OYE LOCA!, supra note 50, at 4.
82. See ¡OYE LOCA!, supra note 50, at 4; see also James N. Green, Queers in Revolutionary Cuba, 7 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 649, 650–51 (2001) (describing these policies
as a form of “antihomosexual prejudice” advanced by Castro early in post-revolution Cuba).
83. See Lillian Guerra, Gender Policing, Homosexuality and the New Patriarchy of the
Cuban Revolution, 1965–70, 35 SOC. HIST. 268, 268 (2010); IAN LUMSDEN, MACHOS,
MARICONES, AND GAYS:CUBA AND HOMOSEXUALITY 55–81 (Phila: Temple Univ. Press 1996).
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themselves? . . . Anyway, what do homosexuals do for production?—they become shop assistants and interior decorators!84

Official Cuban law promulgated these camps under the “Servicio
Militar Obligatorio[,]” which indicated that any citizens “unfit” for the
armed forces had to be relegated to UMAP camps, which led to
roughly 35,000 internees.85 Many of the internees were gay men and
hundreds were murdered through torture or forced into suicide.86
Teams of psychologists attempting to experiment and “correct” queerness forced some gay internees to undergo hormone therapy.87 The
goal to correct their queerness simply masked the ulterior motive
for why the government shipped these “undesirables” to rural farms
in the first place: harvesting yucca, fruit, and sugar cane to feed the
larger community, which refused to support the queer people back.88
II. UNITED STATES-CUBAN RELATIONS GET A LITTLE QUEER
A. An Exodus and Shifting Attitudes Towards Queer Cubans
By the time Castro disbanded the UMAP camps and egregious
government violence against the queer community diminished
throughout the 1970s, social ostracization89 and formal discriminatory practices—such as lacking positive legal rights with respect to
sexual orientation and gender identity—continued for several more
decades in post-revolution Cuba.90 These negative sentiments against
the queer community were not unique to the Cuban nation; however,
many foreign observers were “shocked” that a leftist country would
be so focused on enhancing the inequity of a group in its citizenry.91
84. LEINER, supra note 56, at 30 (internal quotations omitted).
85. See Joseph Tahbaz, Demystifying Las UMAP: The Politics of Sugar, Gender, and
Religion in 1960s Cuba, DEL. REV. LAT. AM. STUD., 2013, https://udspace.udel.edu/bit
stream/handle/19716/19725/Vol14-2Tahbaz.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://
perma.cc/5S6X-HY2T].
86. See id. (“Two former Cuban intelligence agents have estimated that . . . about 500
[internees] ended up in psychiatric wards, 70 died from torture, and 180 committed
suicide.”).
87. See Giovanny Bravo, The Cuban Government’s Treatment of LGBTQ+ Cubans
Since the Revolution, COW LAT. AM. VOICES WOOSTER (May 2, 2020), http://cowlatin
america.voices.wooster.edu/2020/05/02/the-cuban-governments-treatment-of-lgbtq-cu
bans-since-the-revolution [https://perma.cc/BWZ5-FY2G].
88. See id.
89. See LEINER, supra note 56, at 31 (“Although the UMAP camps were completely
phased out by 1969 . . . coming out of the closet could be extremely disadvantageous.
Even to be accused of effeminate behavior could carry the same stigma.”).
90. See LATNER, supra note 46, at 66 (“The Cuban government’s morality drives against
gay and gender nonconforming individuals, peak[ed] in the 1960s but persist[ed] in milder
forms for two decades.”).
91. Id.
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Even with Castro’s gradual cooling against the queer community, the government encouraged both formerly incarcerated and
socially “undesirable” citizens to leave Cuba altogether during the
Mariel Boatlift beginning in May 1980.92 The government did not
outright police the existence of queer Cubans at the same level as
in previous decades, but the government metaphorically stared at
the queer community—who understood the hint and left Cuba.93 Much
of the island’s LGBTQ+ community sought their next home and
sense of safety in Florida.94 Like certain other Marielitos, the police
subjected queer people seeking passage to the United States to interviews that assessed whether they were legally undesirable enough
to leave the country permanently.95 Queer Cubans were targeted for
removal partially because of their “gender transgressive” style choices;
a floral shirt with light jewelry on a man raised a lavender flag that
he was a “counterrevolutionary homosexual” unfit for Cuban society.96
Some queer people even performed an exaggerated level of perceived
femininity for the opportunity to leave in the early 1980s,97 eventually leading to roughly 20,000 “Marielita[s]” resettling across the
United States during this period.98
Yet these movements proved to be bittersweet, as Cuba developed
increasingly progressive attitudes towards the queer community at
around the same time its queer population was leaving after decades
of government harm.99 In 1979, Cuba became one of the last Latin
American countries to decriminalize consensual intimate acts between
people of the same sex100 although, technically before the United
92. See Wendy R. St. Charles, Note, Recognizing Constitutional Rights of Excludable
Aliens: The Ninth Circuit Goes Out on a Limb to Free the “Flying Dutchman”—Dispensing
with a Legal Fiction Creates an Opportunity for Reform, 4 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 145,
147–48 (1995).
93. See Susana Peña, “Obvious Gays” and the State Gaze: Cuban Gay Visibility and
U.S. Immigration Policy During the 1980 Mariel Boatlift, 16 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 482, 484
(2007) (Queer Cubans faced stigmatization by “official discourses and state policies.”).
94. See id. at 495–96.
95. See id. at 482 (explaining how one queer Marielito “wore the gayest outfit he could
find” on the day of his police interview).
96. Id. at 482, 501.
97. Id. at 482.
98. Gary L. Day, The Saga of the Gay Mariel Boatlift Refugees, PHILA. GAY NEWS
(Jan. 31, 2019, 8:10 PM), http://epgn.com/2019/01/31/the-saga-of-the-gay-mariel-boatlift
-refugees [https://perma.cc/E6HN-R6UW] (emphasis added). The “pejorative” version of
“Marielitos” became synonymous with immigrating queer Cubans.
99. See id. (A “large number of gay Cubans” participated in the “mass migration.”).
100. EDDIE BRUCE-JONES & LUCAS PAOLI ITABORAHY, STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA:
A WORLD SURVEY OF LAWS CRIMINALISING SAME-SEX SEXUAL ACTS BETWEEN CONSENTING
ADULTS, 9 (INT’L LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS & INTERSEX ASS’N 2011). Only Chile,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Panama had yet to decriminalize this behavior while Argentina,
El Salvador and Venezuela had all done so during the 1800s. Id.
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States did so formally in 2003 with Lawrence v. Texas.101 Similarly,
Cuban law recognized that people could self-identify as transgender
during the 1990s—yet again before the United States.102 Not long
after, in the late 1990s, Cuba also equalized its age of consent laws
for same-sex couples to those of heterosexual couples under Article
310 of the Cuban Penal Code.103 However, remnants of othering queer
communities still existed in the legal text despite this progress; Article 310 did not merely make it legal for all Cubans to have sex at
a specific age and, instead, the Cuban government made a conscious
effort to mention “homosexual[lity]” and “prostitution” as specific legal
“practice[s]” above the age of consent.104
Regardless of these shifts, the Marielitas and other exiled Cubans
fashioned themselves new lives in the United States with the expectation that they would never go back—even if Cuba did change for
the better.105 Their inability to return as citizens of Cuba meant these
changes were permanent and recognized as such under the Wet
Foot-Dry Foot Policy.106 These new identities both assimilated into
American culture and also retained a sense of home with places like
“Little Havana” in Miami, Florida.107 Certain queer Cubans even had
their lives cut short upon realizing that the AIDS crisis affecting the
international community had impacted their own bodies even before
immigrating to the United States108 and many others realized the
101. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that homosexual “private
sexual conduct” may not be criminalized). Although a formal decision did not occur until
2003, actual acts of this nature between homosexuals were not strictly policed across the
United States, though, it was at least possible. See Why Sodomy Laws Matter, ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/other/why-sodomy-laws-matter [https://perma.cc/Q4AD-HE3R] (last
visited Dec. 6, 2021).
102. LATNER, supra note 46, at 271.
103. See CUBA CÓDIGO PENAL, art. 310 (1997).
104. See id. Scrutinizing these moments of progress in Cuban social equality does not
diminish the fact that its achievements occurred well in advance of other Latin American
countries or even certain jurisdictions in the United States. See BRUCE-JONES &
ITABORAHY, supra note 100, at 10–11.
105. See Cuban Exiles in America, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience
/features/castro-cuban-exiles-america [https://perma.cc/FTR2-496Y] (last visited Dec. 6,
2021); Horacio N. Roque Ramírez, Borderlands, Diasporas, and Transnational Crossings:
Teaching LGBT Latina and Latino Histories, 20 OAH MAG. HIST. 39, 41 (2006) (discussing the immigrant journey leading to “full enfranchisement” of migrant minorities,
including Cubans).
106. Annasofia A. Roig, Comment, No Way, USA!: The Lack of a Repatriation Agreement
with Cuba and Its Effects on U.S. Immigration Policies, 13 FIU L. REV. 875, 886–87 (reviewing repatriation procedures between the United States in Cuba following mass
immigration movements of the 1980s and 1990s).
107. See Cuban Exiles in America, supra note 105 (explaining the influence of Cuban
culture in Miami).
108. Day, supra note 98.
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expected acceptance of their queer identities would not be tolerated
in Florida and even stigmatized.109
B. Immigrant Queer Cubans as a Recognized Social Group
With the influx of Cuban immigrants throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, courts in the United States
adjudicated several cases involving the Cuban queer community who
all hoped they would be allowed to stay given their unique tensions
with the Cuban government.110 Castro may have encouraged his “undesirable” people to leave, but whether the United States legitimized
each of their reasons for political asylum—and for how long—was a
different story.111
The greater queer community specifically earned this legitimacy
in U.S. immigration courts as “homosexuals” for the first time in
1990—a full decade after the Mariel Boatlift began.112 Marielito,
Toboso-Alfonso, explained to immigration judges in this seminal case
that his identity as a homosexual in Cuba made him a target for “persecution” throughout his life.113 The Cuban government had been
compiling and maintaining folders “on all [suspected] homosexuals”
including one on him, which required that he “appear for a hearing”
multiple times a year since the government began creating these files
in 1967.114 Despite progressive attitudes towards the queer community in Cuba, Toboso-Alfonso testified that these hearings occurred as
recently as 1980 and involved examinations of his body, interrogations
concerning his sexual history, and detainment by police for several
days without cause purely because of his homosexual identity.115
After being identified as a homosexual and harassed in his workplace by the Union of Communist Youth, Cuban law enforcement
notified him to either flee the country or be imprisoned for up to four
years for being homosexual.116 The Board of Immigration Appeals
upheld the “immigration judge’s withholding of deportation to Cuba[,]”
109. See ¡OYE LOCA!, supra note 50, at 178–79 (“[T]he stigma of the Mariel gay generation contributed to its systematic erasure.”).
110. See id. at x; see also Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
111. See ¡OYE LOCA!, supra note 50, at x, 178–79.
112. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. at 819; Heather Kolinsky, The Shibboleth of
Discretion: The Discretion, Identity, and Persecution Paradigm in American and Australian
LGBT Asylum Claims, 31 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 206, 221–22 (2016) (confirming
Matter of Toboso-Alfonso as the establishing case for recognition of the homosexual identity in the immigration context).
113. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. at 820.
114. Id. at 820–21.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 821.
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despite the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s appeal.117 The
Board acknowledged that “government threat[s]” to the homosexual
identity indicated a threat to freedom that was recognizable under
the Immigration and Nationality Act.118
But willingness from the U.S. judicial system to protect people
like Toboso-Alfonso,119 who fled Cuba on the basis of their queer identity, became short-lived once it recognized that the Cuban government
had developed a sufficient amount of equality for queer people—at
least superficially.120 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
denied a queer person’s petition for deferral of removal back to Cuba
partially because they found his “likelihood of . . . arrest to be speculative.”121 Despite evidence that the Cuban government still targeted
and fined the queer community for having “homosexual meetings”,
the court found these instances “isolated.”122 Instead, the court focused on Fidel Castro’s public acceptance of “responsibility for past
mistreatment of gay men” along with recently progressive Cuban
legislation to be more reflective of the true queer experience.123
Curiously, this level of firmness against similarly situated queer
communities worldwide has not been equally applied by U.S. courts.124
Utilizing sexual orientation as a Particular Social Group for valid
asylum cases continues to be viable for queer people internationally,
and the scope of this social group has even widened beyond just
homosexuality—this is even for countries providing only modest
protections for queer people like Cuba.125 So what makes the gradual, yet uncertain Cuban tolerance of its queer community any safer
and less demanding of attention?
III. MODERN LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Reflections on Recent Cuban Movements
To an extent, recognition of this progress in Cuba by federal
U.S. courts was accurate.126 Yet beyond the previously described advance
117. Id. at 820, 823.
118. Id. at 823.
119. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. at 823.
120. See Roig v. Holder, 580 F. App’x 4, 7 (2d Cir. 2014) (denying a queer Cuban named
Pedro Rafeael Roig’s petition for deferral of removal to his native country).
121. Id. at 6.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. See Kolinsky, supra note 112, at 228, 235 (explaining how the U.S. courts have
approached issues involved the LGBTQ+ community).
125. See, e.g., id. at 228–29 (describing why the Bureau of Immigration Affairs shifted
from “social visibility” to “social distinction” when defining a particular social group).
126. See James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation,
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ments for the queer community in Cuba and an increasing level of
acceptance for the queer community among Cubans,127 significant
constitutional changes providing better protections have barely occurred.128 At the very least, the 2019 Constitution updated its language in Articles Eighty-One and Eighty-Two to refer to families and
the institution of marriage in a vague fashion by not specifying sex
or gender,129 a welcome change from the 1940 and 1976 versions.130
Instead, the Constitution now reads “[a]ll people have the right to
start a family . . . regardless of their structure”131 and marriage is
ambiguously a “social and legal institution . . . of spouses.”132
Mentioning the institution of same-sex marriage explicitly in
future revisions of the Constitution is not an argument of semantics,
but necessary due to continued vacillations of queer empowerment
throughout Cuba.133 For instance, impactful endorsements for equality
from figures like current President Miguel Díaz-Canel134 and Mariela
Castro—daughter of Raul Castro, the previous leader of the Communist Party of Cuba—have drastically helped the queer community
gain protections and positive attention,135 yet legislators still removed
same-sex marriage-affirming language from a recent constitutional
draft amidst political tensions.136
Modern resistance to queer rights in Cuba seems to hinge on the
discrepancy of acceptance between the nation’s conservative voting
18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 42 (1994) (noting that progress for sexual minorities
has improved considerably even before the millennium).
127. Jose Gabilondo, Whither the Revolution? Framing Political Animosities Between
Sexual Minorities and Churches in Cuba’s New Constitution, 23 HARV. LATINX L. REV.
43, 58 (2020).
128. See Draft of Cuba’s New Family Code Opens Door for Gay Marriage, AP NEWS
(Sep. 16, 2021, 8:10 PM), https://apnews.com/article/cuba-marriage-dc8ae3cda134e8d90d
32ec593c2340e9 [https://perma.cc/V8M7-LFN2] (a draft of Constitutional changes included
recognition of same-sex marriage; however, this draft faced opposition within Cuba).
129. CONST. CUBA 2019, art. 81, 82.
130. See CONST. CUBA 1940, art. 43; CONST. CUBA 1976, art. 36.
131. CONST. CUBA 2019, art. 81.
132. CONST. CUBA 2019, art. 82.
133. See Draft of Cuba’s New Family Code Opens Door for Gay Marriage, supra note
128 (explaining the political landscape for explicitly including same-sex marriage in a
revised Constitution).
134. John Walsh, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel Becomes the Country’s First
Leader to Support Same-Sex Marriage, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2018, 10:39 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/cuban-president-miguel-diaz-canel-announces-support-of
-same-sex-marriage-2018-9 [https://perma.cc/8A6G-YESF] (reporting the leader’s wishes
to allow “marriage between people, without limitation”).
135. Gabilondo, supra note 127; Vanessa Chesnut, Raul Castro’s Daughter to Push for
Gay Marriage in Cuba, NBC NEWS (May 7, 2018, 5:57 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/fea
ture/nbc-out/raul-castro-s-daughter-push-gay-marriage-cuba-n872026 [https://perma.cc
/6P4K-FAHA] (describing Castro’s efforts to intensify “sanctions for anti-LGBTQ violence”).
136. Gabilondo, supra note 127, at 65.
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majority deciding legal referendums and perhaps those of the more
tolerant Cuban judges.137 For example, a three-judge panel with the
Popular Municipal Court Boyeros recently granted a Cuban woman,
Eumnice Violeta Cardoso Pérez, custody of her children that she
would continue raising with her same-sex partner.138 This contrasts
with sentiments concerning the National Assembly’s awaited constitutional revisions for Cuba in 2022.139 Affirmative language granting
queer people the right to marry during these expected revisions next
year is uncertain,140 but it is unsurprisingly reflective of the Cuban
Catholic Church’s conservative influence on government decisions141
and the fact that only one Cuban legislator is openly gay.142
It is difficult to acknowledge Cuba’s progress in the context of
queer rights with much objectivity solely because of its inherently
restrictive government structure.143 The safest advancement of queer
Cubans’ rights thus far has been dependent upon the centralized Communist government acting first or recognizing its prior mistakes
after marginalizing or outright torturing them.144 Even then, the queer
community’s dynamic and sometimes conflicting interests from within
its subpopulations demand that society not treat the community
homogeneously.145 Strategies for advancement of any set of rights
are complicated, and there is necessarily never one right answer—
conflict is expected.
Not every queer person in Cuba, for example, has agreed with
Mariela Castro’s perspective on advancing LGBTQ+ rights in Cuba,
137. See id. at 67 (explaining how judicial review could operate in this context).
138. Eumnice Violeta Cardosa Perez v. Guillermo Gomas Vera, No. 541 Fam. Expediente
No. 344 (Tribunal Mun. Popular Boyeros Cuba 2017).
139. See Gabilondo, supra note 127, at 67 (indicating little optimism for queer rights
in the upcoming Cuban referendum).
140. Tremenda Nota, Cuba Could Have Marriage Equality in 2022, WASH. BLADE
(Dec. 24, 2019), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2019/12/24/cuba-could-have-marriage
-equality-in-2022 [https://perma.cc/W9UL-RU3P].
141. Gabilondo, supra note 127, at 67 (explaining the Catholic Church’s success “in
bending secular law to its religious doctrine” in Cuban constitutional law).
142. Tris Reid-Smith, Gay Politician Asks Cuba to Pass Same-Sex Marriage Without
A Referendum, GAY STAR NEWS (June 1, 2020), http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/gay
-politician-asks-cuba-to-pass-same-sex-marriage-without-a-referendum [https://perma.cc
/MC75-QQ5N]; Nota, supra note 140.
143. See Hugh Williamson, Cuba Events of 2020, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 3, 2020, 8:27
AM), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/essay/hrw-grapples-with-covids-challenges
[https://perma.cc/79LR-7MDV] (detailing the repressive tactics of the Cuban government).
144. See LEINER, supra note 56, at 28; Tahbaz, supra note 85.
145. See Libby Adler, T: Appending Transgender Equal Rights to Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Equal Rights, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 595, 598–99 (recognizing that lawmakers
have detrimentally conflated gay, lesbian and bisexual issues with transgender issues
in certain contexts).
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which has led to the detainment of certain citizens merely differentiating their views.146 Is her way the only way? This variety is interpreted
as public criticism of the government—a “violation.”147 Inflamed by
the shortage of resources during the COVID-19 Pandemic,148 queer
Cubans’ frustration with their nation’s treatment of the LGBTQ+
population has grown even louder in 2021, despite the inevitably violent outcomes law enforcement carried out against them.149 For
example, the Cuban transgender community has been particularly
vocal about being targeted by law enforcement for baseless arrests
and the increased difficulty they face in obtaining employment while
being trans amidst “economic collapse” in the nation’s current climate.150 This “variety” of opinions is not merely unacceptable but also
subjects the queer community to detainment and “quick trial” convictions without any right to counsel, which has become more common
during the 2021 protests.151
B. Comparative Study of Queer Rights in Latin America
Furthermore, the current government’s refusal to participate with
international organizations, like the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, also means that any efficiently recognized advancements of
queer rights are not automatically applied in Cuba; the nation moves
at its own pace to a detriment, even when other countries officially
recognized same-sex marriage in bulk after this organization’s 2017
decision.152 Various Latin American countries’ participation in the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights meant these freedoms automatically extended to countries like Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay.153
146. See Michael K. Lavers, Cuban LGBT Activist Prevented from Leaving Country,
WASH. BLADE (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/01/09/cuban-lgbt-ac
tivist-prevented-leaving-country [https://perma.cc/HSJ2-U38R].
147. Id.
148. See Ernesto Londoño & Daniel Politi, ‘Terror’: Crackdown After Protests in Cuba
Sends a Chilling Message, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2021), http://www.nytimes.com/2021/07
/28/world/americas/cuba-protests-crackdown-arrests.html [https://perma.cc/6HYV-VKJ9]
(explaining the development of Cuba’s July 11 protests and the negative treatment of
participating citizens).
149. Tremenda Nota, LGBTQ Cubans Participate in July 11 Protests, WASH. BLADE
(July 17, 2021), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2021/07/17/lgbtq-cubans-participate-in
-july-11-protests [https://perma.cc/2AWD-7ARB].
150. Id.
151. See Londoño & Politi, supra note 148.
152. See, e.g., Cristian González Cabrera, Costa Rica’s Progress on Marriage Equality
Should Inspire the Region, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 3, 2020, 8:27 AM), http://www.hrw
.org/news/2020/06/03/costa-ricas-progress-marriage-equality-should-inspire-region#
[https://perma.cc/NX3D-CH67]; see Lavers, supra note 146.
153. See Nico Lang, Venezuela President Urges Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage After
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Cuba is not the only Latin American country grappling with the advancement of queer rights, or lack thereof, addressing these issues
uniquely.154 Each Latin American country has its own branches of
government with varying strengths and influences.155 Certain governments like those of Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay depend on
legal progress “from the legislature, political parties, interest groups,
and the executive branch” whereas Colombia and Brazil strictly
utilize “legislative and executive branches.”156
Argentina’s most significant moment in the passage of same-sex
marriage occurred after a same-sex couple’s attempt to get married
in Buenos Aires failed, which led to massive international media
attention—funneling activism for change in the country’s congress.157
Despite various forms of protests by both sides on the issue—including
the Catholic Church—the Senate passed queer rights-affirming language in Argentinian legislation.158 The legislation changed the country’s matrimonial law—modeled after similar language and strategies
borrowed from Spain’s earlier recognition of same-sex marriage159—
to indicate “contracting parties” could get married more generally
rather than just “husband” and “wife” specifically.160 This form of
advancement highlights the limitations Cuba would have if its people
attempted a similar approach.161 If discriminatory behavior against
same-sex couples occurs publicly, any public discourse that could
garner international attention or serious forms of activism would
become impossible given the regime’s explicit bar on Cuban people
expressing dissatisfaction with government choices.162
Brazil’s more gradual approach to providing equality for queer
people may be more illuminating for a place as conflicted as Cuba.163
Pope’s Comments, THEM (Oct. 23, 2020), http://www.them.us/story/venezuela-president
-nicolas-maduro-pope-francis-same-sex-marriage-legalization [https://perma.cc/T6RS
-DUG9]. However, Latin American countries’ application of this verdict has not been scrutinized and is likely being applied more divisively than suggested.
154. See Alyssa Julian, Note, Redefining LGBTQ and Abortion Rights in Latin America:
A Transnational Toolkit, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 296–97 (2020).
155. See id. at 296.
156. Id. at 296–97.
157. See id. at 298–99.
158. See id. at 299, 303, 327.
159. Id. at 299–300.
160. CÓD. CIV. (2010) (Arg.) (modified by Law No. 26.618, July 21, 2010, Matrimonio
Civil).
161. See id.; see also Williamson, supra note 143 (explaining that “[t]he Cuban government represses and punishes dissent and public criticism. Tactics against critics include
beatings, public shaming, travel restrictions, short-term detention, fines, online harassment, surveillance, and termination of employment.”).
162. See id.
163. See Daniel De La Cruz, Comment, Explaining the Progress of the Right Of Same-Sex
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More conservative Brazilian legislators during the early 2010s
rationalized the Brazilian Civil Code’s exclusion of same-sex couples
because upholding or creating a “family” necessitated marriage between a man and a woman.164 In a bittersweet move, the Brazilian
appeals court system then undercut the legislators’ interpretation
of the law to allow for same-sex unions to exist on a case-by-case
basis but not marriage specifically; extending the exact rights of
marriage to same-sex couples merely without the phrasing of “marriage” being applied.165 Within just a few years, the entire Brazilian
government began allowing same-sex couples to receive these benefits under the more traditional “marriage” phrasing.166 This progression underscores the pathway the queer community in Cuba might
consider turning to if the phrasing of “marriage” will not be amended
in future revisions to include them.167 Supporters of queer rights in
Cuba may decide to compromise on the usage of same-sex “unions”
temporarily until Cuban leaders can reconcile some of their religious
biases and simply extend “marriage” to all in the years to come.168
Yet the ultimate signal of positive change for queer Cubans seems
to come from potential shifts within Venezuela.169 Often tied together
in international social and political commentary due to the close socialist alliance Fidel Cruz and Hugo Chávez Frías began developing
in the 1990s,170 current Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s comments concerning the LGBTQ+ community may inspire Cuba to do
the same.171 Given the Roman Catholic Church’s recent support for
same-sex civil unions through Pope Francis, President Maduro indicated his hope that the government’s National Assembly would
Couples in South America, 14 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 323, 330–31 (2013) (summarizing the
Brazilian judicial landscape on queer equality).
164. See id. at 330 (“The legislature . . . indicat[ed] that a ‘family’ could only be created
through the marriage of one man and one woman.”).
165. See id. at 331.
166. See Brazil Judicial Panel Clears Way for Gay Marriage, FRANCE 24 (May 14,
2013), http://web.archive.org/web/20130609172419/http://www.france24.com/en/201305
14-brazil-judicial-panel-clears-way-gay-marriage (“A top judicial panel cleared the way
for same-sex marriage in Brazil Tuesday, ruling that gay couples could not be denied
marriage licenses.”).
167. See id.
168. See id. (explaining the progression from unions to marriages in Brazil).
169. BRIAN FONSECA & JOHN POLGA-HECIMOVICH, THE TIES THAT BIND: I. TWO NATIONS,
ONE REVOLUTION: THE EVOLUTION OF CONTEMPORARY CUBA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS, LAT.
AM. PROGRAM 1 (2020).
170. Id.
171. Venezuela’s Maduro, Citing Pope, Asks Congress to Consider Same-Sex Marriage,
REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2020, 6:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics
-lgbt/venezuelas-maduro-citing-pope-asks-congress-to-consider-same-sex-marriage-id
USKBN27737E [https://perma.cc/D8WJ-CPPY].
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positively address same-sex marriage benefits in 2021.172 If the similar
religious and political convictions making up Venezuela and Cuba
are any indication, Cuba’s skepticism to formalize marriage equality
for the queer community might be quelled by this kind of universal
interpretation of Pope Francis’ comments in Catholic-heavy nations.173
The mutual dependence between Venezuela and Cuba suggests the
former’s recognition of queer rights may necessitate the latter’s recognition of it as well.174 Although hopeful, one must wonder why the
reverse is not true about Cuban rights extending similarly across the
border to Venezuela.175 Currently, Venezuela’s only legal protections
for the queer community include the decriminalization of intimate
same-sex conduct, an equalized age of consent law for same-sex
couples that matches that of heterosexual couples, and an employment discrimination prohibition on sexual orientation—quite a bit
less than what Cuba has already achieved itself.176 If recent Cuban
leadership can emphasize rights and utilize government funds for
queer people in nuanced areas like gender confirmation surgery177 or
in family law matters,178 why has Venezuela not reciprocated a similar level of acceptance if the two countries are truly that similar?
CONCLUSION
Although Cuba’s progress has advanced beyond those of other
nations and is commendable in context, the fact that protesting
ideals and the encouragement of useful conflict is, by its nature, not
tolerable inhibits Cuba’s ability to be taken seriously as a nation
that cares about its queer community.179 This conflict is a consistent
observation from this Article’s review of social and legal histories in
Cuba throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Perhaps
the nation needs to address its own existential conflict before it is
capable of discerning those that exist between its people. Cuba has
172. Id.
173. See id. (noting that “[t]he Pope’s comments were the clearest language yet he has
used on the rights of gay people.”).
174. See FONSECA & POLGA-HECIMOVICH, supra note 169, at 11 (describing a relationship of “interdependence.”).
175. See, e.g., BRUCE-JONES & ITABORAHY, supra note 100, at 9, 11 (providing an overview of changes in the laws criminalizing consensual same-sex conduct).
176. See id.
177. Jessica Geen, Cuba Pays for Gender Reassignment Surgery, PINK NEWS (Mar. 10,
2010), http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2010/03/10/cuba-pays-for-gender-reassignment-surgery
[https://perma.cc/WT7M-JFLK].
178. See CONST. CUBA 2019, art. 81.
179. See Gabilondo, supra note 127, at 68–69.
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always held back from fully endorsing socially progressive attitudes
historically promulgated by Marxism180 partially because it has been
unsure of what to do with its ties to religion-fueled capitalist ideals.181
Queer Cubans have experienced similarly complex feelings about
the nation: a sense of pride in where they came from and disappointment in not being recognized by a country they have worked so hard
to keep alive.182

180. See id. at 69.
181. See The Americas, Fidel, the Church and Capitalism, ECONOMIST (Aug. 16, 1997),
http://www.economist.com/the-americas/1997/08/14/fidel-the-church-and-capitalism
[https://perma.cc/LT2D-K3FG].
182. See B. Ruby Rich & Lourdes Arguelles, Homosexuality, Homophobia, and Revolution: Notes Toward an Understanding of the Cuban Lesbian and Gay Male Experience,
Part II, 11 SIGNS 120, 135–36 (1985).

